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Emotional Distress Damages For Fear Of
Contracting AIDS: Should Plaintiffs Have
to Show Exposure To HIV?
I. Introduction
It is difficult to imagine any other phenomenon which has permeated
the social consciousness of our society in the last decade more than the
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, or AIDS.' AIDS is not a disease
in and of itself, but is the final stage in the progression of an illness,
characterized by complete failure of the immune system.2 AIDS is
comparable to cancer in that both diseases are latent conditions which do
not develop immediately after exposure to the causative agent.' An
individual will develop AIDS only after being infected with the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV).4 An infected person will typically not
1. At least 284,000 cases of AIDS have been reported to the Center for Disease Control (CDC)
since 1981. Impact of the Expanded AIDS Surveillance Case Definition on AIDS Case Reporting -
United States, First Quarter, 1993, 42 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 308 (1993). The
number of living individuals diagnosed with AIDS as of January, 1992, was around 90,000. Id
From January 1, 1993 to March 31, 1993, over 35,000 cases of AIDS were reported to CDC, a 204%
increase over the number reported for the same period in 1992. Id. This increase is partly
attributable to the expanded surveillance definition of AIDS promulgated by the CDC on January 1,
1993. Id. However, the great majority of the I to 2 million Americans who are infected with human
immunodeficiency virus type I (HIV), the cause of AIDS, but are currently healthy. John N.
Krieger, Acguired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Antibody Testing and Precautions, 147 J. UROLOGY
713, 713 (1992).
AIDS is essentially a composite of regional epidemics, affecting different segments of the
population differently. CDC, Update: Acguired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - United States, 1992,
42 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 547 (1993). In most major cities, 20 to 50 percent'of
homosexual and bisexual men are infected with HIV, while infection among intravenous drug users
ranges from 50 to 60 percent in New York City to less than 5 percent in other areas. Id. at 549.
Intravenous drug users and men engaging in sexual intercourse with other men still constitute 80.3
percent of AIDS cases. Id. at 557. However, the steady increase in heterosexual transmission of
HIV indicates that AIDS affects nearly every individual. HIV infection occurs in approximately 0
to 1.2 per 100 persons in populations without any identifiable risk factors. Krieger, supra, at 713.
Infection is more common among non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics than among nonHispanic
whites. Update: Acguired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - United States, 1992, 42 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 547, 551 (1993). Race is not a risk factor but probably is a risk marker,
reflecting other aspects of low socioeconomic status. Id
2. Jonathan W. M. Gold, MD., HIV- IInfection: Diagnosis and Management, 76 MED. CLINICS
N. AM. 1,1 (1992).
3. The analogy to cancer is relevant because fear of AIDS caselaw grew out of cases addressing
fear of cancer. See infra Part 111.
4. There are currently two known HIV viruses-, type I and type 2. HIV-2 remains largely
confined to Africa, while HIV-I is now found in most of the world. Flossie Wong-Staal, PhD., The
AIDS Virus: What We Know and What We Can Do About It, 155 W. J. MED. 481 (1991).
The HIV virus is a retrovirus, a classification of viruses found in nearly all animals. Gold,
supra note 3, at 5-6. Retroviruses are transmitted by commingling of body fluids during sexual
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manifest symptoms of AIDS for an average of five to seven years.'
Although it may be possible to delay the development of AIDS, all HIV-
infected individuals will eventually develop AIDS.6
This comment will explore few of the many legal consequences of
HIV infection. In particular, many plaintiffs have sought emotional
distress damages in a variety of situations involving a potential exposure
to HIV. This comment explores the viability of emotional distress claims
for fear of AIDS , both as an independent cause of action and as a form
of parasitic damages. Part II discusses emotional distress damages in
general. Part III concerns emotional distress claims for fear of a future
disease or condition, including cancer and AIDS. The discussion
emphasizes the disagreement among courts as to whether or not a
physical injury or a showing of exposure to HIV should be required for
such claims. This comment concludes that a plaintiff claiming emotional
distress for fear of contracting AIDS should at least be required to prove
that he or she was exposed to the HIV virus.
II. Emotional Distress As A Cause Of Action
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to allow recovery solely for
mental disturbances caused by a defendant's negligence." The rationale
is that emotional distress is usually a temporary affliction and is easily
fabricated.' Courts are usually more receptive if the mental anguish
occurs in the context of an intentional tort, which by definition involves
extreme and outrageous conduct calculated to cause physical or emotional
damage to the victim.9 In order to recover for emotional distress caused
by a defendant's intentional, reckless or outrageous conduct, a plaintiff
may not even have to show accompanying physical harm.' I However,
contact, blood-to-blood contact or neonatally (from mother to child). Id. at 6. These viruses
normally affect the immune system as well as the central nervous system. Id. Retroviruses infect
actively replicating cells', HIV-I specifically targets the CD4+ lymphocyte (commonly known as the
T-helper), remaining latent for extended periods of time until the cell is activated. Id.
5. Approximately 50% of HIV-infected men will develop AIDS within seven years of a positive
HIV-test. Gold, supra note 3, at 5. Since it is nearly impossible to estimate the actual date of
infection in most cases,determining the rates of progression from HIV infection to development of
AIDS is difficult. Id. at 4-5 Development of AIDS occurs more rapidly in children and the elderly,
while it is slower among young adults. Id. The speed of development can vary according to
geographic location, since certain strains of the HIV virus are more virulent than others. Id. Race
and sex may also contribute to the rate of progression. Id.
6. Gold, supra note 3, at 4.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965); W. KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW TORTS § 54, 361 5th ed. 1984.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 cmt. b (1965).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
10. See State Rubbish Collectors Assoc. v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952) (allowing
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emotional distress damages have traditionally been "parasitic," arising out
of other damages recoverable for physical injury caused by a defendant's
tortious conduct."
For many years, courts universally adhered to the so-called "impact
rule" which limits recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress
to plaintiffs who can prove that the defendant's negligent conduct caused
a physical "impact" or injury to the plaintiff's person." Courts relying
on this rule reasoned that a plaintiff who suffered from some
ascertainable physical injury would also experience fright and nervousness
at the time of the injury. 3 In addition, courts discouraged fraudulent
claims by making recovery for mental distress contingent on an
objectively verifiable accompanying physical injury. 4
Problems arose as courts began to loosen the definition of "impact"
to include minor physical contacts that were often only tenuously
connected to the harm, ranging from slight bruise 5 to inhalation of
smoke 6 to getting dust in one's eye.' 7 As the term "impact" became
diluted, the rule essentially lost its function. Today, only a handful of
courts still adhere to the "impact rule."'"
In lieu of a physical impact requirement for emotional distress
recovery, most jurisdictions began to require that the mental anguish be
supported by a physical manifestation and, therefore, subject to objective
measurement by the fact-finder."' Varying opinions as to what
plaintiff to recover emotional distress damages without showing physical harm of any sort); Agis v.
Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976) (remedying intentional infliction of emotional
distress when there was no physical injury except crying and general mental anguish), LaBrier v.
Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (deeming defendant's loud and angry
accusation that plaintiff's husband committed theft while aware of her weakened mental condition
as "outrageous" conduct; plaintiff's physical injuries were crying fits, swollen and itchy eyes, a rash
over her body and a return to medication.) See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 and
cmt.d (1965) (defining "outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress" as the infliction of
emotional anguish so great that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it).
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965).
12. KEETON, supra note 8, § 54, at 363.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Conley v. United Drug Co., 105 N.E. 975 (Mass. 1914) (granting emotional distress
damages to plaintiff bruised when explosion caused him to faint and hit the floor).
16. Mortor v. Stack, 170 N.E. 869 (Ohio 1930).
17. Porter v. Delaware, Lackawanna Western R.R. Co., 63 A. 860 (N.J. 1906).
18. Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, and Missouri still adhere to the impact rule. Payton
v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E. 2d 171, 176 n.6 (Mass. 1982). Payton provides a thorough and
informative discussion of emotional distress damages. Id. at 174-78.
19. Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 181 (requiring physical harm to be "manifested by objective
symptomatology and substantiated by expert medical testimony."). Accord Wyatt v. Gilmore, 290
S.E.2d 790 9N.C. Ct. app. 1982); Towns v. anderson, 579 P.2d 1163 (Colo. 1978); Barnhill v. Davis,
300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 155 (Me. 1979)
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constitute an "injury" or "illness" caused by mental distress led to
problems with the physical manifestation requirement."0 Most courts
adopting the physical manifestation standard believe that some sort of
objectively verifiable evidence is needed to corroborate the plaintiff's
claim of emotional distress and prevent feigned mental anguish or the
"tricks that the human mind can play upon itself."'"
Physical manifestations of mental anxiety over the possibility of
contracting a future disease may be demonstrated through direct
testimony by the plantiff about experiencing crying fits, general
nervousness, anxiety, stress, loss of sleep and so on.22 Expert testimony
supporting the plaintiffs testimony, such as the opinion of a psychologist
or psychiatrist,23 is usually convincing. The testimony of a minister or
other counselor may also lend weight to a plaintiffs claim of mental
anguish.24
None the less in 1970,25 several jurisdictions began to allow
plaintiffs to recover emotional distress damages under a general
negligence theory, regardless of whether the plaintiff sustained any
("objective symptomatology" requirement); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Young, 384 So.2d 69, 71 (Miss.
1980) ("genuine physical consequences" requirement); Foumell v. Usher Pest Control Col, 305
N.W.2d 605 (Neb. 1981); Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300 (N.H. 1979) ("objective medical
determination" standard, through use of expert medical testimony). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND
OF TORTS §§ 436, 436A (1965).
20. Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728,733-34 (Md. 1979) (defining "physical injury" as mental
harm "capable of objective determination"); Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163 (Colo. 1978) (en
banc) (finding physical manifestations or mental illness sufficient) (emphasis added); Vicnire v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 155 (Me. 1979) (requireing illness or bodily harm "substantially
manifested by objective symtomatology"); Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 304 (N.H. 1979)
(requiring that the harm be and proved through qualified medical witnesses").
21. Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 175.
22. See, e.g., Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982); Figlar v.
Gordon, 53 A.2d 645 (Conn. 1947).
23. See e.g. Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984) (allowing doctor of psychology to
testify about the legitimacy of plaintiff's emotional and psychological trauma over fear of future
illness after she sustained brain, head and nose injuries; doctor also testified that her anxiety and
depression would intensify with time); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, reh 'g denied 5 N.Y.2d
793 (N.Y. 1958) (allowing neuropsychiatrist to testify that plaintiffs fear of developing cancer after
a severe x-ray bum could produce permanent anxiety). See also Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495
A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (distinguishing "cancerphobia" from fear of contracting
cancer; since a "phobia" is a recognized psychological illness, medical experts are necessary to verify
its presence, whereas a simple "fear" may be more subjective and understandable in simple terms by
the fact-finder, therefore not always necessitating the use of expert testimony).
24. Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1983).
25. Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970).
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physical harm or injury in connection with the defendant's conduct.26
These jurisdictions normally limited recovery for "serious mental
distress... where a reasonable [person], normally constituted, would be
unable to adequately cope with the mental stress."27 Not withstanding
these decisions most jurisdictions still retain the physical harm
requirement for emotional distress recovery, although strong dissents
signify a trend toward a broader cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress. 28  For example, in Payton v. Abbott Labs,
29
Justice Wilkins and two others dissented on the grounds that a physical
harm rule is arbitrary and allows plaintiffs with only minor injuries to
recover for emotional distress while plaintiffs without any physical harm
but great emotional distress go uncompensated." Justice Wilkins felt
that, at least with regard to certain plaintiffs, the genuineness and
reasonableness of their emotional distress claims should be submitted to
a jury.
3'
One additional development in the law liberalizing the standard for
recovery of negligent infliction of emotional distress concerns plaintiffs
who experience mental anguish because of harm to a third party. By the
mid-1960's, most courts had abandoned the impact rule, opening the door
for claims of emotional distress resulting from one's fear for the well-
being of another.32 Most courts allowed such a third-party victim to
recover for mental distress as long as that person was within the "zone
of danger" of the defendant's conduct." Under this theory, a son hit by
a motorist while crossing the street with his mother is the actual victim
of the defendant's conduct, but the mother can recover emotional distress
damages if she witnessed her son's injury and was within the "zone of
danger" of the defendant's conduct. However, if our hypothetical mother
26. The seminal case in the development of a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress was Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980). In Molien,
husband and wife plaintiffs suffered emotional distress after their doctor negligently misdiagnosed
the wife with a venereal disease. The court did not require proof of physical injury since the
emotional distress was foreseeable by the doctor. Therefore the jury could determine the existence
and extent of the plaintiffs' mental anguish.
27. Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970).
28. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982) (4-3 decision barring recovery);
Fourell v. Usher Pest Control Co., 305 N.W.2d 605 (Neb. 1981) (5-2 decision).
29. 437 N.E.2d at 171.
30. Id. at 193 (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Under the impact rule, such a claim would be impossible since the victim of the emotional
distress must by definition be the actual victim of the defendant's tortious conduct.
33. KEETON, supra note 8, § 54, at 365. For cases adopting the "zone of danger" rule, see
Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1979), Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980),
Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hospital of Vermont, Inc., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980).
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witnessed the accident from a safe distance, she would be barred from
recovery under the "zone of danger" rule.
In 1968, California remedied the latter situation by extending the
doctrine of negligent infliction of emotional distress to its limits in Dillon
v. Legg.34 The Dillon court explicitly rejected the "zone of danger" rule
and created what is now known as the "bystander rule., 35 Under this
approach, the Dillon Court restricted recovery to situations in which the
plaintiff is located near the accident scene, directly observes the event,
and is related in some way to the victim.36  Moreover the Dillon
approach imposes a duty on all negligent defendants to protect not only
the injured party but anyone who might foreseeably suffer emotional
harm because of injury to the actual victim. 37  At least a dozen states
have adopted the Dillon approach, with most emphasizing the need for
a close familial relationship between the bystander and the victim.
38
The Restatement (Second) of Torts summarizes the general rules
adhered to today. "If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an
unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance
to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without
bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such
emotional disturbance."39  Generally, physical harm is required for
emotional distress recovery, although the harm need not be the result of
an actual physical impact to the plaintiff; physical manifestation of mental
distress is usually sufficient. Claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress usually will not lie without proof of physical harm, although a
growing minority have rejected this requirement in order to protect
victims from mental anguish caused by an actor's conduct when that
conduct involves an unreasonable risk of emotional harm.40 With this
discussion in mind, the concept of emotional distress recovery can now
34. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (allowing mother and sister to recover for mental distress after
seeing defendant's vehicle strike victim as she crossed the road).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 914.
37. Id. at 912.
38. Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980) (relying on Dillon factors to award emotional
distress damages to a mother who watched unsuccessful efforts to rescue her seven year old son
trapped in an elevator shaft). See also Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Corso v.
Merrill, 406 A.2d 300 (N.H. 1979); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822 (N.M. 1983); Sinn v. Burd,
404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979); D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1975).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965).
40. Taylor v. Baptist Medical Ctr., Inc. 400 So.2d 369 (Ala. 1981); Molien V. Kaiser Found.
Hosps., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980); Montinieri v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 398 A.2d 1180
(Conn. 1978).
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be applied to a specific factual scenario: fear of contracting a future
disease because of defendant's conduct.
III. Emotional Distress For Fear Of Future Disease Or Condition4'
Emotional distress for fear of contracting AIDS is a relatively new
remedy, since the disease itself has only been recognized since 1981.
Consequently, courts look to analogous situations for guidance,
particularly cases in which a plaintiff seeks emotional distress damages
because some present injury might lead to a future disease or condition.
Most jurisdictions allow a plaintiff to recover parasitic damages for fear
of future harm; in other words, the damages are attached to the award for
the actual physical injury caused by the defendant's tortious conduct.42
A court's inquiry in these types of cases generally focuses on the
defendant's duty, breach, and injury to the plaintiff and the
reasonableness of a plaintiff's emotional distress over the possibility that
a future disease or condition may develop as a consequence of the
existing injury. 3 In the context of any fear of future disease claim, the
injury requirement often means "exposure" to a disease-causing agent.
41. This remedy must immediately be distinguished from damages recoverable for the
possibility of the actual occurrence of a future condition or disease, which is outside the scope of this
comment. Generally, these kinds of damages cover future medical expenses for monitoring of the
plaintiff's condition as well as costs for treating the condition when and if it arises.
42. Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985); Herber v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3rd Cir. 1986); Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1978);
Hayes v. New York Cont. R.R., 311 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1962); Werlein v. United States, 746 F.Supp.
887 (D. Minn. 1990); Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 663 F.Supp. 727 (E.D. Pa. 1987), later
proceeding, 692 F.Supp. 568 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Coover v. Painless Parker, Dentist, 286 P. 1048 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1930); Flood v. Smith, 13 A.2d 677 (Conn. 1940); Warner v. Chamberlain, 30 A. 638 (Del.
1884) (by implication); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Wisner
v. Illionis Cont. Gulf R.R., 537 So.2d 740 (La. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 540 So.2d 342 (La.
1989); Buck v. Brady, 73 A. 277 (Md. 1909); Hoffman v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 255 S.W.2d 736
(Mo. 1953); Alley v. Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Co., 74 S.E. 885 (N.C. 1912); Ayers v.
MacOughtry, 117 P. 1088 (Okla. 1911) (by implication); Trinity & S. Fry. Co. v. O'Brien, 46 S.W.
389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898).
43. The following courts all require a plaintiff's fear and anxiety to be "reasonable," which is
a determination to be made by the jury. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394
(5th Cir. 1986) (applying Mississippi law), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1987); Hagerty v. L&L
Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Louisiana law); Wetherill v. University of
Chicago, 565 F.Supp. 1553 (N.D. 111. 1983); Anderson v. W.R Grace & Co., 628 F.Supp. 1219
(D. Mass. 1986) (applying Massachusetts law); Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984);
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982); Birkhill v. Todd, 174 N.W.2d 56 (Mich. Ct
App. 1969); Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co., 98 S.W.2d 969 (Mo. 1936); Devlin v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985); Walsh v. Brody, 286 A.2d 666 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1971); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982) (by implication); Elliott
v. Arrowsmith, 272 P. 32 (Wash. 1928) (recognizing rule); Funeral Servs. by Gregory, Inc. v.
Bluefield Community Hospital, 413 S.E.2d 79 (W.Va. 1991).
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With regard to fear of contracting AIDS, a plaintiffs anxiety will usually
arise after some sort of injury exposes the plaintiff to the HIV virus.
Nevertheless, before specifically addressing emotional distress damages
for fear of contracting AIDS, it is necessary to discuss emotional distress
damages for fear of developing cancer.
A. Fear Of Cancer As A Basis For Emotional Distress Damages
A series of decisions involving plaintiffs who feared developing
cancer as a result of a defendant's tortious conduct set forth the principles
guiding courts in fear of AIDS cases. An understanding of the analysis
developed in these cases is crucial to a thorough understanding of the
reasoning behind the fear of AIDS cases. The fear of cancer cases
discussed below involved plaintiffs exposed to asbestos, diethylstilbestrol
(DES), and other toxic chemicals.
1. Asbestos Plaintiffs
Many workers exposed to asbestos fibers in the course of their
employment have sought emotional distress damages for fear of
developing cancer. In all such cases where emotional distress damages
were awarded, there was no issue concerning exposure. All the plaintiffs
were unquestionably exposed to asbestos fibers since they had contracted
asbestosis44 or some other condition peculiar to asbestos exposure;
45
therefore, the physical injury requirement was automatically fulfilled.
When plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate exposure to asbestos,
recovery for emotional distress was denied.46  Although the typical
asbestos plaintiffs fear may not be technically reasonable,47 most courts
44. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Mississippi
law); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Devlin v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
45. Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying New Jersey law)
(plaintiff showed evidence of pleural thickening); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d
1129 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Texas law) (plaintiff showed pleural thickening, plaques, calcification
and asbestosis).
46. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1985) (denying relatives of
asbestos workers recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress because they failed to allege
injury caused by exposure to asbestos fibers; plaintiffs were allowed to recover for intentional
infliction of emotional distress since defendant's conduct was arguably "extreme and outrageous,"
although no physical harm was shown); Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 471 A.2d 493 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984) (denying wife of worker afflicted with asbestosis recovery for negligent infliction
of emotional distress until she could demonstrate physical injury linked to her alleged exposure to
asbestos particles on her husband's clothing).
47. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that
plaintiff with asbestosis could not prove that asbestosis causes cancer, only that it increases chances
that cancer will occur in the future, but ultimately holding that plaintiffs fears of future cancer were
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allow asbestos plaintiffs to demonstrate the genuineness of their fears by
submitting expert testimony as to the probability that they will develop
48cancer, or that they will need periodic medical surveillance for
cancer.49  A plaintiff may also demonstrate the genuineness of his fear
or anxiety by relying on personal knowledge. For instance, a plaintiff
may have seen co-workers suffer from asbestos-related health
problems."
In Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp.,5 the New Jersey Superior Court
summarized the logic behind allowing emotional distress recovery even
if the likelihood is low that the future disease or condition will actually
develop.52 The court emphasized the foreseeability of the plaintiff's
injury in the context of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff, rather than
looking solely at the severity of the potential consequences. 3 Asbestos
plaintiffs have been successful in arguing that as users of asbestos
products they fall within the zone of any potential risk created by that
use. Another way of stating this proposition is that the risk of using
asbestos was foreseeable to the manufacturer. This notion of hinging
emotional distress damages on the defendant's duty is especially relevant
in the fear of contracting AIDS cases discussed below.
2. DES Daughters
The rationale behind allowing emotional distress recovery for fear
of a future disease is illustrated by cases involving daughters of women
treated with diethylstilbestrol (DES) during pregnancy.54  Two of the
leading cases in this area illustrate the willingness of courts to remedy
such emotional distress claims. One court focused on the necessity of a
justified since asbestosis was a painful reminder of plaintiffs exposure to asbestos and the possibility
of cancer).
48. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Mississippi
law) (permitting plaintiff to establish a greater than 50% likelihood he would develop cancer); Gideon
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Texas law) (finding that 50%
likelihood of cancer fulfilled the requirement of a "medical probability" that a future disease will
come to fruition); Shelton v. College Station, 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Texas law).




53. Id. at 497.
54. Diethylstilbestrol (DES) was an experimental drug widely administered to pregnant women
to prevent miscarriages. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 172 (Mass. 1982). DES has been
identified as a causative agent in the development of clear-cell adenocarcinoma, a rare and deadly
cancer of the reproductive organs of daughters of women treated with DES. Id. DES has also been
linked to adenosis in these women, and more common, non-carcinogenic affliction of the female
reproductive organs. Id.
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physical harm as a prerequisite for recovery, 5" while the other focused
on the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' anxiety.56
In Payton v. Abbott Labs,57  Massachusetts' highest court
recognized that one may experience emotional anziety as a result of an
increased statistical likelihood of developing a future disease, but decided
that such damages were not recoverable unless the plaintiff could produce
evidence of physical harm.5" The court noted that in cases allowing
recovery of emotional distress damages absent proof of physical harm, the
mental distress was usually reasonably foreseeable.59 For instance, if the
defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless,6" or if the plaintiff
witnessed the serious harm of a family member.6' The Payton court
held that in order to recover emotional distress damages for fear of
contracting a future disease, the plaintiff must show (1) negligence, (2)
emotional distress caused by the defendant's conduct, manifested by
"objective symptomatology," and (3) that a reasonable person in the
plaintiff's position would have suffered comparable mental distress.62
The Payton rule is comparable to the analysis set forth in the asbestos
cases. Both require physical harm and a reasonable, genuine
apprehension of a future event. However, in Payton, the court never
considered the medical probability of whether a plaintiff will develop the
complications associated with exposure to DES.
In Wetherill v. University of Chicago," a federal court addressed
the issue of medical probability in detail." The court rejected a
standard which would have required the plaintiffs to show with medically
"reasonable certainty" that certain complications would develop.65 The
court noted that a "reasonable certainty" standard would be at odds with
traditional notions of proximate cause, which only require that the
emotional distress be reasonably foreseeable.66 In other words, the fear
55. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
56. Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F.Supp. 1553 (N.D. III. 1983).
57. 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
58. Id. at 180.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978) (justifying recovery for physical
symptoms of emotional distress because plaintiffs were closely related to the victim, although not
within the zone of danger). Contra Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 171 (indicating that the plaintiffs were
the direct victims of the defendant's tortious conduct, but had suffered no physical injuries).
62. Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 181.
63. 565 F.Supp. 1553 (N.D. III. 1983).
64. Id.
65. Cf Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Ca. 1993) (imposing a "more
likely than not" requirement that cancer will develop).
66. Wetherill, 565 F.Supp. at 1559.
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that a future disease might develop must be reasonable, but the plaintiff's
burden does not rise to the level of showing a high degree of
likelihood.67 In opting for this "reasonable fear" standard, the court
stated that "fears of future injury can be reasonable even where the
likelihood of such injury is relatively low. '68  The Wetherill plaintiffs'
anxieties satisfied this "reasonable fear" standard since there was a known
causal relationship between DES and cancer. The court also noted that
any reasonable person in the plaintiffs' position would have similar
anxiety when exposed to constant media coverage of scientific evidence
relating to that causal connection.69
The Wetherill rule suggests that an element of subjectivity is proper
in the consideration of whether or not to allow emotional distress
recovery, while Payton's requirement of a physical injury reflects a
concern for an objectively verifiable standard. This tension infects every
case involving emotional distress claims. Notably, the Wetherill court
considered the in utero exposure to DES as a "physical impact" of the
defendant's conduct,7" while the Payton court required the plaintiffs to
show additional physical harm.7'
3. Exposure to Toxic Chemicals
Other claims involving fear of developing cancer as a basis for
emotional distress recovery involve exposure to carcinogenic chemicals.
In Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,72 the defendant contaminated a
family's well-water supply with chlordane while treating the property for
termites.73 Although the family members were not physically harmed
by ingesting the tainted water or by the resulting mental anguish,74 the
67. Id.
68. Id. See also Baylor v. Tyrrell, 131 N.W.2d 393, 402 (Neb. 1964) (requiring fear of
developing cancer to have a "reasonable basis"); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 251 (N.Y.
1958) (requiring plaintiff to establish only a "basis for her mental anxiety," even if she can show
only that cancer might develop); Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co., 418 A.2d 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)
(awarding plaintiff emotional distress damages for fear of cancer and heart attack, even though her
own doctors were certain that plaintiff's anxiety was medically unreasonable).
69. Wetherill, 565 F. Supp. at 1560. See also Ferrara, 152 N.E.2d at 252 (allowing emotional
distress damages and justifying plaintiff's cancerphobia in part because it is "general knowledge" that
wounds which do not heal frequently become malignant; this general knowledge comes from such
sources as physical culture lectures to high school and college students, radio advice from insurance
companies, and newspaper articles).
70. Wetherill, 565 F. Supp. at 1560.
71. Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 171.
72. 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
73. Id. Chlordane is a possible carcinogen. Id. at 434.
74. The wife was routinely upset during the period of time following the ingestion of the
chemical and would call her husband at work crying; she also noticed a general malaise and
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Tennessee Supreme Court upheld an award for negligent infliction of
mental anguish for fear of future health problems because a plaintiff had
ingested an indefinite amount of a harmful substance as a result of a
defendant's negligence.75 The court found that the ingestion was a
sufficient "injury" in and of itself to support a claim for mental
distress.76 However, the Laxton court restricted the period of recovery
to the time between the plaintiff's discovery of exposure to the chemical
and the date when scientific or medical information allayed the plaintiffs'
fears of future injury."'
As in asbestos and DES cases, plaintiffs claiming exposure to toxic
chemicals must also show that their fear of developing a future disease
is genuine.7" A plaintiff may have special knowledge of the effects of
a toxic substance to which he or she has been exposed, 79 or such
information may be a matter of common knowledge."0 Furthermore, a
plaintiff may receive medical advice to undergo periodic treatments or
tests for cancer,8' or directly feel the physical effects of the chemical.82
Recently, one federal court applying California law allowed a group
of plaintiffs exposed to toxic chemicals to recover for emotional anxiety,
but suggested that absent an attendant physical injury such relief would
be barred. 3 The court held that such parasitic damages for fear of
cancer are available when there is a verifiable causal nexus between the
listlessness in her children, heightening her anxiety. Id. at 433.
75. Id. at 434.
76. Laxton, 639 S.W.2d at 434.
77. The plaintiffs' time period for recovery of emotional distress damages ran from the date
they discovered they had ingested chlordane until the date blood tests revealed that none of the
family members exhibited abnormalities attributable to chlordane exposure. Id. This period of time
amounted to about ten months. Id.
78. See, e.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F.Supp. 1219, 1228 (D. mass. 1986)
(applying Massachusetts law). The plaintiffs alleged exposure to carcinogenic chemicals in their
well-water and sought emotional distress damages for fear of an increased risk of leukemia and other
cancers. The court held that the plaintiffs could recover "only for that degree of emotional distress
which a reasonable person normally would have experienced under [the] circumstances." Id. (citing
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (Mass. 1982)).
79. Hagerty v. L&L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318-319 (5th Cir. 1986),
reconsideration, 797 F.2d 256 (1986) (noting that plaintiff was doused with carcinogens which
contained properties he was aware of from studying the chemicals, and that plaintiff had also
previously observed benzene absorb into his fingers and this knowledge heightened his fear since his
entire body was exposed to the chemical).
80. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252-53 (N.Y. 1958) (court acknowledged the
legitimacy of "common knowledge" that non-healing wounds often indicate a cancerous condition).
81. Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 319. See also Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1983) (applying
federal and Rhode Island law).
82. Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 317. (stating that plaintiff experienced dizziness, leg cramps and a
stinging sensation in his extremities).
83. Barron v. Martin-Marietta, Corp. 868 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ca. 1994).
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injury and the possible development of cancer.84 Recall that in Payton
v. Abbott Labs,85 a Massachusetts court imposed a similar physical
injury plus reasonableness standard. 6
Thus far, this discussion has centered on emotional distress damages
for fear of a future disease or condition caused by an actor's tortious
conduct. Normally, there is no question as to whether or not the plaintiff
was actually exposed to a toxic agent; it is simply a prerequisite for the
initiation of the action. When exposure has not been demonstrated,
courts are quick to dismiss a plaintiffs claim for emotional distress.8 7
With this background in mind, we can now proceed to the discussion of
the "fear of contracting AIDS" cases in which exposure to the causative
agent is often a major issue.
B. Emotional Distress Recovery For Fear Of Contracting AIDS
Recovery for emotional distress damages for fear of contracting
AIDS is a relatively new remedy, since the disease itself is only in its
second decade. Courts confronting emotional distress claims for fear of
AIDS have relied on much of the caselaw discussed above to establish
standards for recovery. A survey of the major decisions in this area
reveals discord among various state and federal courts over the
appropriate standard for allowing recovery for emotional distress for fear
of AIDS. The majority of courts impose some sort of physical injury
requirement, following the lead of the fear of cancer cases. The physical
injury may take various forms. Some courts require emotional distress
damages to be parasitic to physical damages, while the majority of courts
acknowledge that actual exposure to HIV constitutes a physical injury.
The unique deadliness of AIDS engenders unusually severe anxiety, even
without actual proof of exposure to HIV. As a result, a substantial
minority of courts emphasize the reasonableness of the plaintiffs fear
rather than physical injury.
84. Id. at 1211.
85. 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
86. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g. Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1533-34 (D. Kan. 1990)
(denying plaintiff emotional distress damages for alleged exposure to airborne gases since no expert
evidence was offered to show that actual exposure to the chemicals occurred or that there was any
physical injury which may have been caused by such an exposure); Harper v. Illinois Cent. Gulf
R.R., 808 F.2d 1139, 1140 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying Louisiana law) (denying plaintiffs recovery for
mental anguish resulting from fear of future health hazards after a train derailed more than one mile
from their home and released dangerous chemicals; plaintiffs could offer no proof that they had been
exposed to the chemicals, but presumably intended to incite the passions of the jury by introducing
evidence of the carcinogenic properties of the chemicals, a tactic the court sought to forbid at all
costs).
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1. Plaintiff Must Show Accompanying Physical Injury
A number of courts require a plaintiff seeking emotional distress
damages for fear of contracting AIDS to be parasitic to damages for an
actual physical injury. Some courts allow physical symptoms of
emotional distress to accomplish the same goal. In either case, a physical
injury serves to objectify the very subjective fear.
A recent case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania illustrates the
"parasitic" view of damages for fear of contracting AIDS. In Griffin v.
American Red Cross,88 the court relied on Pennsylvania law and denied
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to an individual
misdiagnosed with HIV. The diagnostic error was corrected within one
day. The court barred recovery because the symptoms were caused by
a mistaken belief rather than by the HIV virus.8 9 Essentially the court
requires demonstration of a legally cognizable physical injury, such as
infection with HIV, to recover parasitic emotional damages.
Within the last year California has settled on a physical injury
requirement to recover for fear of AIDS. In Kerins v. Hartle," a
California appellate court9' required an actual present physical injury
88. _F. Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1994).
89. The Griffin court relied heavily on Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 623 A.2d
3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). In Lubowitz, the plaintiffs participated in an in vitro fertilization program.
During the procedure, the defendant hospital transfused placental serum blood obtained from multiple
donors into the wife's body. Lubowitz, 623 A.2d at 4. Three months later, the plaintiffs were
informed that the placental blood had tested positive for the AIDS antibody, a result which was later
discovered to be false. Id. During the period of time before the false-positivity of the results was
discovered, the wife allegedly suffered from mental distress, manifested by nausea, vomiting and
diarrhea, prompting her to seek damages for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Id. In denying recovery for her emotional distress, the court noted that since the placental blood was
not actually infected, the plaintiff's symptoms were simply not caused by the HIV virus. Id. But see
Moore v. Delaware Valley Health Network, Inc., _ F.3d _(3d Cir. 1994) (allowing emotional
distress recovery for fear of tuberculosis after plaintiff was mistakenly diagnosed with TB and began
treatment for the disease) and Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980)
(allowing recovery for emotional distress where doctor mistakenly diagnosed the wife with genital
herpers).
90. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). In Kerins, the plaintiff, Jean Kerins,
underwent a complex and lengthy surgical procedure performed by the late Dr. James Gordon. Id.
at 622. Over one year after the surgery, Kerins viewed a television news broadcast in which Gordon
revealed that he was afflicted with AIDS. Id. at 623. In the same broadcast, two of Gordon's
colleagues commented about the prevalence of surgeons cutting themselves during surgical
procedures, and criticized Gordon for not informing his patients of his HIV status and the risk of
exposure to HIV during surgery. Id. Kerins sought an HIV test the following day and received
negative results two weeks later. Id. Kerins filed suit against Gordon and his employer for severe
mental anguish and emotional distress for fear of contracting AIDS, the trauma of undergoing testing
for HIV, and the knowledge that "even using current testing methods, negative results will not rule
out with 100 percent certainty the admittedly remote possibility" of HIV infection. Id.
91. The California Supreme Court granted review of Kerins and then transferred the matter to
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before a plaintiff could recover for fear of AIDS.92 The court allowed
an exception: the plaintiff can make out a fear of AIDS claim by proving
a breach of a duty by the defendant, exposure to HIV, and that the fear
stems from a knowledge, corroborated by medical opinion, that it is more
likely than not that the plaintiff will develop AIDS in the future due to
the exposure. 93 The court specifically sought to bar recovery when a
plaintiff's fear is only speculative at best.94 The court justified the
rather strict rule with policy reasons, namely that the potential class of
plaintiffs for such claims is too large and "the proliferation of fear of
AIDS claims in the absence of meaningful restrictions would run an equal
risk of compromising the availability and affordability of medical, dental
and malpractice insurance, medical and dental care, prescription drugs,
and blood products."95
Other courts allow plaintiffs to fulfill the physical injury requirement
by showing the existence of physical symptoms of emotional distress.
For example, in Howard v. Alexandria Hospital,96 the plaintiff sued for
fear of AIDS after her doctor operated on her with unsterilized
instruments.97 The Virginia Supreme Court held that the requisite
physical injury, existed because the plaintiff experienced physical pain,
headaches, nausea, vomiting, fever, chills, sweating and some side effects
of antibiotic treatment.9" This standard is reminiscent of the requirement
the court of appeals with directions to vacate the decision and reconsider the cause in light of Potter
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Ca. 1993) (reaffirming the lack of an independent
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress in California unless the defendant breaches some
other legal duty which threatens physical injury, and emotional distress is proximately caused by that
breach, or unless defendant assumes duty to plaintiff in which emotional condition of plaintiff is the
object).
92. Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 177.
93. Id. at 177.
94. Id. at 179.
95. Id.
96. 429 E.E.2d 22 (Va. 1993).
97. Id. at 23.
98. Id. at 25. Similar physical symptoms resulted in recovery by other plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 892 (W. Va. 1992) (sleepnessness and
loss of appetite); Burk v. Sage Prod., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (loss of sexual function, but
court denied an award of damages since the plaintiff failed to show exposure to HIV had occurred).
But see Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. III. 1988) (applying Illinois law)
(denying wife recovery for emotional distress over fear of AIDS after husband was injected with
HIV-infected blood because she could not prove physical harm resulted from the stress).
At least one court has held that the diagnostic testing procedures for HIV/AIDS do not
constitute "bodily injury" since the tests themselves are necessary to determine if an injury has
actually occurred. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840 P.2d 288, 292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)
(interpreting terms of an underinsured motorists policy). However, a positive HIV-test can itself
constitute an injury. Funeral Serv. by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79,
82 (W. Va. 1991) (by implication, where court relied on a series of negative HIV-tests to establish
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that emotional distress caused by the defendant's conduct be manifested
by an "objective symptomatology," 99 a standard which was borrowed
from asbestos litigation.0 The objective symptomatology standard is
self-explanatory; courts are simply reluctant to award emotional distress
damages where there is no objectively verifiable proof of the injuries
caused by the stress.
2. The Exposure Standard
A majority of courts allow an independent claim of negligent
infliction of emotional distress for fear of AIDS so long as the plaintiff
can show actual exposure to the HIV virus as a result of the defendant's
conduct. This exposure requirement qualitatively is not much different
than the physical injury requirement discussed above. After all, exposure
to HIV seems to constitute an "injury." Requiring proof of exposure
seems like another way of requiring objective evidence, but at the same
time represents a compromise between objectivity and the subjective
nature of a plaintiff's fear of AIDS.' '
In Burk v. Sage Products,0 2 the plaintiff paramedic had been stuck
by a needle while using a container for used syringes.0 3 He sued the
manufacturer of the container for negligent infliction of emotional distress
because several AIDS patients were seen on the floor where the injury
occurred.'0 4 The Eastern District court entered summary judgment for
the defendant because the plaintiff could not prove that the needle which
stuck him was ever used on an AIDS patient; therefore, he could not
prove exposure to the HIV virus.'°5
An analogous situation confronted the high court of West Virginia
in Johnson v. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc.,106 a case
involving a police officer who assisted in the restraint of an unruly
patient at the defendant's hospital.0 7 During the struggle, the patient
bit himself on the arm, then bit the plaintiff on the arm.' When the
officer learned the patient was infected with the HIV virus, he sued the
a lack of physical injury).
99. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (Mass. 1982).
100. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
101. See infra Part III.B.3, discussing the highly subjective "general reasonableness" standard.
102. 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
103. Id. at 286.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
107. Id. at 891.
108. Id.
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hospital for emotional distress for fear of contracting AIDS. The court
ruled that the act of biting constituted sufficient proof of exposure, since
the patient's HIV-infected blood commingled with the plaintiffs
blood.19
The same court was again confronted with assessing a plaintiffs fear
of AIDS claim in Funerals by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community
Hospital."'  In Funerals by Gregory, a mortician embalmed a body
released by the defendant, and he was unaware that the decedent had
been an AIDS patient."' The plaintiff sued for intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress for fear of contracting AIDS,
and claimed severe emotional anguish, humiliation and strain on marital
relations." 2  In denying the plaintiffs request for emotional distress
damages, the court noted that the plaintiff offered no evidence showing
that he had actually been exposed to the HIV virus, but could only
speculate about potential exposure during the embalming procedure.'13
Specifically, the court indicated that if the plaintiff could recall cutting
himself during the procedure or somehow having commingled his blood
with the decedent's body fluids, he could demonstrate exposure and thus
a reasonable fear of exposure."4
One jurisdiction which recently changed from a no exposure
requirement to requiring exposure is Tennessee. In Carroll v. Sisters of
Saint Francis Health Services, Inc.," 5 the plaintiff was a visitor at a
hospital and was stuck by a discarded needle when she put her hand into
a used-syringe container, mistaking it for a paper towel dispenser." 6
The plaintiff sued the hospital for negligent, intentional and/or reckless
infliction of emotional distress for fear of contracting AIDS." 7
Because the plaintiff tested negatively for HIV infection and could not
offer proof that she had been exposed to the HIV virus as a result of the
109. Id. at 893. Actual exposure is crucial to the scenario where a plaintiff is bitten by a known
or suspected HIV-carrier. In Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), an x-ray
technician bitten by a patient was denied recovery for his emotional distress for fear of contracting
AIDS since his claim was based on an attendant nurse's off-the-cuff remark that "[this man may
have AIDS." Id. at 126. No evidence was offered to corroborate the nurse's opinion.
110. 413 S.E.2d 79 (W.Va. 1991).
111. Id. at 80.
112. The court only considered the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress since
West Virginia does not recognize negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 84.
113. Id. at 83. The court noted that embalming is a procedure which necessitates direct contact
with the decedent's infected bodily fluids. Id.
114. Id.
115. 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993).
116. Id. at 586
117. Id. at 587.
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needle stick, the Tennessee Supreme Court barred recovery for her mental
anguish."'8
The court adopted the "actual exposure" approach in order to
preserve an objective standard in assessing negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims." 9  However, the court intimated that a
plaintiff can recover for fear of AIDS by showing exposure to HIV
instead of a physical injury. 2' Essentially the court views the exposure
requirement as imposing a lesser burden on the plaintiff than
demonstrating an actual physical injury. 2' Whether this is simply a
semantic argument is unclear.
Courts imposing a physical injury and/or exposure requirement
realize that legitimate claims for emotional distress should not be
overlooked just to prevent fraud. The courts are more concerned with
having an objectively measurable standard than the reasonableness of the
plaintiff's claim. The court in Johnson v. West Virginia University
Hospitals, Inc.122 captures the essence of the rationale: "We emphasize
that our decision (to allow emotional distress recovery) . .. is not to
permit recovery of emotional distress damages to anyone who comes into
contact with a person who is infected with AIDS or merely believes that
a person is infected with AIDS."'2 Some courts, have placed greater
emphasis on the reasonableness of the plaintiffs fears.
3. A "General Reasonableness" Standard
A minority of jurisdictions adhere to a more liberal standard of
recovery for emotional distress damages for fear of AIDS by allowing a
plaintiff to recover for emotional distress without demonstrating exposure
to HIV. The rationale behind such a liberal standard is that because
AIDS is 100% fatal, a reasonable person, even potentially exposed to
HIV, would be fearful. Given the unique deadliness of AIDS, greater
concern for the reasonableness of the plaintiffs fear indicates judicial
118. Id. at 594.
119. Id. The Carroll court does provide a thoughtful discussion of the gradual weakening of
the minimum physical injury requirement in this area of the law. The court acknowledges that
"many actions for emotional damages brought today are radically different from the cases which gave
rise to the requirement in that they involve an exposure to an extremely dangerous agent ... which
may have serious adverse health consequences at some point far into the future." Id. The court opines
in dicta that "in some situations, whether the plaintiff has incurred a literal physical injury has little
to do with whether the emotional damages complained of are reasonable." Id. See infra discussion
of "general reasonableness" standard, which is premised on this notion.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
123. Id. at 894.
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reluctance and perhaps inability to settle on a hard and fast objective rule
in this area of the law.
The Maryland Supreme Court is the only highest state court to
formally adopt a general reasonableness standard. In Faya v.
Almoray, 24 two plaintiffs operated on by an HIV-positive surgeon,
Rudolf Almaraz. Almaraz did not disclose his condition to either
plaintiff.2 5 Subsequently, the plaintiffs read about Almaraz's illness in
a newspaper article and immediately underwent HIV tests, and both
received negative results.'26 Both plaintiffs sued Almaraz and his
employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress for fear of
developing AIDS. 2' The plaintiffs claimed they experienced "pain,
fear, anxiety, grief, nervous shock, severe emotional distress, headache
and sleeplessness" as a result of their anxiety over the possibility of
exposure to the HIV and developing AIDS. 2 '
The trial court dismissed the complaints because the plaintiffs
offered no proof that exposure to the surgeon's blood occurred during
either surgical procedure; therefore, no legally compensable injury
existed.'29 The court noted that the plaintiffs failed to offer reported
cases of surgeon-to-patient transmission of the HIV virus, did not allege
that Almaraz used improper barrier techniques or that any event occurred
during surgery which could have caused a commingling of their blood
and Almaraz's 30 In addition, both plaintiffs tested negative for AIDS
antibodies more than six months after the alleged exposure, assuring, with
over 95% reliability, that the plaintiffs will never develop AIDS as a
result of the operations performed by Almaraz. 3'
In reversing the trial court decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals
disagreed that the plaintiffs' emotional distress was unreasonable as a
matter of law.' The court was satisfied with the mere potential for
124. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
125. Id. at 328.
126. Id. at 329. At the time the newspaper article was published, it had been at least one year
since either plaintiff had been operated on by Almaraz.
127. Id. at 330. The plaintiffs accused Almaraz of operating on them without informed consent.
Id. They further alleged that Almaraz knew of his illness but failed to disclose HIV transmission as
a potential risk involved with the invasive surgical procedures, a risk the plaintiffs claim they would
have avoided had they been informed. Id. A health care worker's duty to disclose his HIV-positivity
to a patient is a growing concern in the field of medical ethics. Unfortunately it is outside the scope
of this comment.
128. Id. at 330.
129. Faya, 620 A.2d at 330-31.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 337.
132. Id. at 339.
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exposure which existed in each of the invasive surgical procedures.'33
This risk, albeit small, was nevertheless foreseeable to Almaraz' 34 The
court noted that it would be unfair to require plaintiffs to show actual
exposure in these situations since most patients lack the information
necessary for proof.'35
The court supported the foreseeable risk standard by emphasizing the
extreme danger of the risk involved, since AIDS is 100% fatal.'36 This
reasoning echoes that of the fear of cancer cases, where the probability
of the risk occurring was not a decisive factor as long as it was
foreseeable to the defendant.' The court limited the plaintiffs'
recovery for emotional distress for fear of contracting AIDS to a
"reasonable window of anxiety." 3' The time period began with the
plaintiffs' discovery of Almaraz's condition and ended with the receipt
of negative HIV test results by the plaintiffs, an event after which the
court felt their fears were legally unreasonable and thus
uncompensable.'39
A factually unusual case arising in New York also gave rise to a
general reasonableness standard. In Castro v. New York Life Insurance
Co., 4' a New York appellate court sustained a cleaning worker's claim
of emotional distress for fear of AIDS after she was stuck by a
negligently discarded needle while at work.'4 ' The court stated that
"[i]f a claim can be tied to a distinct event which could cause a
reasonable person to develop a fear of contracting a disease like AIDS,
133. Id. at 333.
134. Id. at 332, n.3 (acknowledging studies showing no documented cases of surgeon-to-patient
HIV transmission during a surgical procedure).
135. Id. at 333. See e.g. Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal Rptr. 2d 621, 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993),
rev 'd. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. CL App. 1994) (finding that plaintiff operated on by HIV-positive
surgeon asserted that she was in surgery for over four hours, during which time surgeon's hands were
at work in a bloody field, making it difficult to ever know conclusively if he cut himself or not).
136. Fays, 620 A.2d at 333.
137. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. The Faya court used the foreseeable risk
analysis to suggest that Almaraz was negligent in failing to disclose his condition to his patients.
Faya, 620 A.2d at 333. The court did not impose an affirmative duty of disclosure on HIV positive
health care workers; however, the court refused to hold that Almaraz did not have a duty to inform
his patients of the potential risk of HIV transmission during an invasive surgical procedure, regardless
of how small the risk. Id. at 334. The court ruled that this assessment of a doctor's duty should
have been left to a jury and not decided as a matter of law. Id. For support, the court cited
recommendations of the American Medical Association suggesting that HIV positive doctors refrain
from performing surgicalprocedures which create a risk of transmission to patients. Id.
138. Id. at 336.
139. Id.
140. 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
141. Id. at 697.
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there is a guarantee of genuineness of the claim." 42  Although the fact
that Castro injured her thumb was relevant to the court's decision, the
court's decision to use the language "distinct event" rather than "injury"
is significant.'43 Especially relevant to this comment is the court's
reasoning for allowing recovery for mental anguish. The court
emphasizes that the massive informational and educational campaigns
about AIDS waged by health officials in the past decade would make any
reasonable person stuck by a used hypodermic needle from which blood
was drawn fearful of contracting AIDS.' A federal court'45 relied
on Castro to sustain an emotional distress claim for fear of AIDS under
the Federal Employees Liability Act.'46 The court noted that "the
identity of the contaminator in Castro [was] unknown, making the fear of
contraction more reasonable . . . [t]herefore, based upon the
reasonableness of the fear, the breach of the duty, evidence of a specific
incident and an actual physical injury, the facts in Castro arguably would
support a claim even under the more narrow approaches taken by the
lower courts."' 47
4. Reasonableness of Plaintif's Fears as Deciding Factor
The struggle throughout all fear of disease cases is the degree to
which a related physical injury or exposure to a disease causing agent is
needed to make a plaintiff's fears reasonable as a matter of law. A
related procedural issue is to what extent the entire inquiry should
actually be a question of fact, since many cases have been resolved on a
case-by-case basis due to their fact-sensitive nature. Should the plaintiff
have the opportunity to convince a factfinder that her fears are genuine,
even if she has no attendant physical injuries, but only a speculative fear
of having been exposed to MV?
As the above commentary suggests, courts dealing with fear of AIDS
claims face a particularly thorny problem. Courts which choose not to
require a showing of exposure must concern themselves with the
reasonableness of the plaintiff's fears. This concern was addressed in
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 697, 698 Contra Burk v. Sage Prod., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Carroll v.
Sisters of Saint Francis Health Serv., 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993) (both cases requiring exposure
to HIV in the needle-stick scenario).
144. Castro, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 698. Castro testified that she had seen commercials on television
about AIDS and was aware of the possibility of contracting HIV through contaminated blood. Id.
145. Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
146. 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.
147. Id. at 452 (quoting Harry H. Lipsig, AIDS Phobia and Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress, N.Y.L.J., March 26, 1992 at 3,4).
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Wetherill v. University of Chicago4 ' where the district court adopted
a "reasonable fear" standard rather than requiring a high degree of
likelihood that cancer would develop. 4 9  The court relied on the
plaintiff's general knowledge about the carcinogenic nature of DES since
they were exposed to constant media coverage.50 With regard to
AIDS, most plaintiffs allege their fear is reasonable because the
deadliness of AIDS is common knowledge. There has certainly been no
dearth of media coverage of AIDS in the past decade, and one would be
hard pressed to find an individual who does not have at least general
knowledge of the disease, its modes of transmission and its 100% fatality
rate. Courts are certainly not oblivious to this fact. For example, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee acknowledged that the widespread publicity
associated with AIDS and the fatality of the disease lend support to the
idea that the question of reasonableness of a plaintiffs fear should be
decided by a jury and not as a matter of law.' Additionally, Justice
Barry of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District noted in his
thoughtful dissent in Doe v. Surgicare of Joliet, Inc. 52 that the current
explosion of media information about AIDS and its effect on its victims
should at least get the plaintiffs case to a jury, even absent physical
injury or exposure to HIV.153
Justice Barry raises another factor militating in favor of a general
reasonableness standard. Even though the transmission of HIV in certain
situations is highly speculative, the low risk may still be viewed as
unreasonable to a patient operated on by an HIV-positive surgeon.'54
For example, in Kerins v. Hartley,5 5 the plaintiff did not dispute that
148. 565 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. III. 1983). See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
149. See also Baylor v. Tyrrell, 131 N.W.2d 393,.402 (Neb. 1964) (requiring fear of developing
cancer to have a "reasonable basis"); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1958) (requiring
plaintiff to establish only a "basis for her mental anxiety" even if she can show only that cancer
might develop); Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co., 418 A.2d 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (awarding plaintiff
emotional distress damages for fear of cancer and heart attack, even though her own doctors were
certain that plaintiff's anxiety was medically unreasonable).
150. Wetherill,565 F. Supp. at 1560. See also Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252 (N.Y.
1958) (allowing emotional distress damages for fear of cancer in part because it is "general
knowledge" that wounds which do not heal frequently become malignant).
151. Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Serv., 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993). Recall that
the Carroll court ultimately ruled against the plaintiff because it was reluctant to allow a jury to
award damages based only on a subjective emotional trauma. Id.
152. 1994 WL 461796, No. 3-93-0765 (III. App. Ct. 1994) (Barry, J. dissenting) (requiring
showing of actual exposure for negligent infliction of emotional distress for fear of AIDS).
153. Id. at *6. See also supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Wilkins'
dissent in Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982)).
154. Id. at *5.
155. 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 624 (Cal. Ct. app. 1993), rev'd, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994).
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the risk of HIV transmission from a surgeon to a patient was virtually
nonexistent, but she felt the data was irrelevant.'56 She argued that her
fear of AIDS was objectively reasonable, because studies of the risk of
surgeon-to-patient HIV transmission are inconclusive since research has
not been done to adequately quantify the risk.' The plaintiff also
offered expert testimony that certain individuals will continue to test
negative for HIV for prolonged periods of time after infection, leading
the intermediate appellate court to note that "even if [the plaintiff's] test
results were negative for the next 25 years, she could not be 100%
certain" she was not infected during the surgical procedure.' Kerins
pointed out that she was in surgery for over four hours, during which
time Gordon's hands were at work in a bloody field, making it difficult
to ever know conclusively if he cut himself or not.'
B. The Need for an Exposure Reguirement
The notion of the seriousness of the risk outweighing the remoteness
of the risk was seen in asbestos and DES cases. 60  However, in the
previous fear of cancer cases, exposure to a causative agent was never an
issue because a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and
the plaintiffs emotional injury was always present.' 61 By abandoning
the exposure requirement in fear of future harm cases and focusing on the
reasonableness of the plaintiffs fears, courts are tampering with the very
notion of proximate cause necessary for any negligence action, including
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The causative link between a
defendant's tortious conduct and a plaintiffs fears is too fundamental to
be discarded. An exposure requirement has the advantage of also serving
156. Id. at 624. Under the previous Kerins decision not requiring exposure, the court relied on
data showing the risk of a health care worker sustaining a cut during surgery is about 6.9%, while
the risk of HIV transmission from the worker to the patient as a result of such an injury is
approximately 0.3%. Id at 629 (citing, Recommendations for preventing Transmission of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive
Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1 (1991)).
157. Kerins, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 625.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 628.
160. See, e.g., supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text discussing the Wetherill decision,
where the court held that the fear of a future injury can be reasonable even where the likelihood of
the future contingency actually occurring is low. Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp.
1553 (N.D. ItI. 1983). Recall, however, that the Wetherill court also stressed that the in utero
exposure to DES constituted a physical injury, an important requirement for recovery of emotional
distress damages in most jurisdictions. Id.
161. See, e.g., supra note 74 and accompanying text discussing Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating
Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982), where ingestion of a harmful substance was necessary for
recovery.
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as a physical injury, providing a strong causal link between the
defendant's conduct and the emotional harm.
The problem with the general reasonableness standard is not the
award of damages to these particular plaintiffs, but the ramifications of
using the standard in other contexts. The general reasonableness standard
essentially dilutes the very meaning of reasonableness. By making
reasonableness contingent on foreseeability of a risk, a plaintiff can
theoretically recover by simply alleging fear of AIDS and showing that
the fear is subjectively plausible by demonstrating that the risk was
foreseeable.
The court in Doe v Doe162 anticipates two situations where
deference to a plaintiff's subjective fears could have undesirable
consequences. Any spouse who could allege infidelity against his or her
mate could theoretically bring a separate tort action for emotional distress
damages for fear of contracting AIDS since any act of sexual intercourse
in our society involves a foreseeable risk of exposure to the IV
virus. 6  Even if the risk is miniscule, the general reasonableness
standard permits a cause of action. Similar situations will arise in non-
sexual relationships. For example, if an individual has had a blood
transfusion in the last fifteen years, presumably a duty to disclose this
fact to a sexual partner would arise.
One fact that most medical experts will agree on is that we still
know very little about AIDS. In situations involving something less than
sexual intercourse, the general reasonableness standard becomes even
more difficult to apply. Most experts agree that the HIV virus cannot be
transmitted through casual contact, but if one expert can document one
case of HIV being transmitted through saliva, a "general reasonableness"
standard might be satisfied, since none of the decisions specify how much
of a risk is sufficent to establish foreseealility. We are left to assume that
the smallest imaginable risk will make an individual's fears reasonable
and compensable.
A plaintiffs anxiety about contracting AIDS often reflects general
misperceptions that exist in our society about the disease. Public
reactions and stigmas associated with AIDS will likely have some effect
on the numbers and types of claims brought by people who fear
162. 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 598 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
163. See Id. The World Health Organization estimates that 250 to 500 million people currently
engage in behavior placing them at risk for HIV infection. Jonathan W. M. Gold, MD., HIV-I
Infection: Diagnosis and Management, 76 MED. CLIUNCS N. AM. 1 (1992). It is estimated that over
half of all Americans are not taking any personal precautions to protect themselves from HIV
infection, although high-risk individuals are more likely to do so. Robert J. Blendon et al., Public
Opinion and Aids: Lessons for the Second Decade, 267 JAMA 981, 982 (1992).
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contracting AIDS because of some encounter with an HIV-infected
individual. Studies indicate that stigmatizing attitudes and erroneous
beliefs about AIDS and AIDS patients are still prevalent in our society.
One such study found that a large number of people still believe HIV can
be transmitted through casual contact, such as kissing, sharing drinking
glasses, using public lavatory facilities, being coughed or sneezed on by
an infected person, or through insect bites.'64 Many Americans still
believe AIDS is primarily an affliction of male homosexuals or
intravenous drug-users.'65 Another survey indicated that a substantial
percentage of people nationwide thought HIV could be transmitted
through insect bites or by donating blood.'
Quite simply, Americans are frightened of AIDS. As many as 82
percent of respondents to one survey called AIDS a "very serious"
problem for all people living in the United States.'67 Nearly 75 percent
felt that the AIDS epidemic will worsen throughout this decade.'68
Nearly one half believed AIDS is the worst health problem in this
country, with cancer trailing in second place at 18 percent. 69 Media
coverage of the AIDS epidemic has been constant for the last ten years,
so it is not surprising that AIDS is a matter of common knowledge on
which nearly everyone has an opinion.
It has already been suggested that the general reasonableness
standard allows a plaintiffs subjective fears to enter into the formula for
determining emotional distress recovery for fear of contracting AIDS.
Once subjective beliefs begin to enter into fear of AIDS case, the
possibility arises for recovery in situations where exposure is highly
unlikely, such as through casual contact with an infected individual. At
the very least, an increase in the number of fear of AIDS cases may
occur as potential plaintiffs try to hit the litigation jackpot by alleging
emotional anguish over a fear of contracting AIDS. By permitting
plaintiffs to recover for mental anxiety over fear of AIDS in the absence
of actual exposure, we risk fueling misperceptions about AIDS and how
it is transmitted. The requirement of actual exposure to HIV safeguards
164. Gregory M. Herek, PhD and John P. Capitanio, PhD, Public Reactions to AIDS in the
United States: A Second Decade of Stigma, 83 Am. J. of Pub. Health 574, 574-75 (1993).
165. Id. at 575.
166. HIV/AIDS Knowledge and Awareness of Testing and Treatment-Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System 1990, 40 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 794 (1991).
167. Robert J. Blendon, et al., Public Opinion and AIDS: Lessons for the Second Decade, 267
JAMA 981, 981 (1992).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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against unnecessary litigation and prevents fraudulent claims because it
is objectively verifiable and not based on mere assertions.
The litigation itself can also fuel public misperceptions. Plaintiffs
claiming fear of AIDS usually question the reliability and validity of
current HIV-testing procedures to some extent. In Carroll, an expert
testified that AIDS-testing is not completely reliable since
"seroconversion may be delayed for twelve months or more following
exposure."' 70 In Kerins, the plaintiff relied on statistics that anywhere
from 95 percent to 99.8 percent of HIV-infected individuals will test
positive within six months of exposure. 7 ' One study indicates that
certain populations may continue to test negative for WV antibodies
using the ELISA test even though they are infected.'72
This is just one example of the differing opinions among AIDS-
researchers on key points. Such disparity makes it difficult to set any
legal standards, especially a rule as vague as the general reasonableness
standard. If a plaintiff s ability to recover emotional distress damages for
fear of AIDS is contingent on that fear being reasonable, by what
standard shall "reasonableness" be determined? If one expert states that
reliable test results can be achieved in six months while another believes
twelve months are needed, how shall a court determine the period of time
during which recovery should be allowed? Crucial questions like these
must be addressed but are left unanswered by a general reasonableness
standard.
IV. Conclusion
Recovery of damages for fear of a future disease or condition has
traditionally been limited to plaintiffs who can demonstrate that their
fears are reasonable and tied to some physical injury. This physical
injury can either be an actual impact, such as the nearly defunct "impact
rule," or a physical manifestation of the mental distress. In cases
involving intentional or reckless conduct by the defendant, the physical
injury requirement may be abandoned as long as the plaintiffs fears are
170. Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Serv., Inc., No. 02A01-9110-CV-00232, 1992
WL 276717 at *4 (Tenn. App. 1992).
171. Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d
172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
172. Elaine M. Sloand, MD, et al., HIV Testing: State of the Art, 266 JAMA 2862 (1991)
(citing S.M. Wolinsky, et. al., Human immunodeficiency virus type I (HIV-1) infection a median of
18 months before a diagnostic Western blot: evidence from a cohort of homosexual men, 111 Annals
of Internal Med. 961 (1989)). In this study, 14 out of 16 homosexual men repeatedly had negative
HIV tests for up to 18 months but were HIV positive according to a more sophisticated but less
widely used test.
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reasonable. As a result, the reasonableness of a plaintiff's anxiety over
the possibility of a future disease or condition is crucial to any form of
emotional distress recovery. With regard to fear of cancer cases,
plaintiffs always satisfied this reasonableness requirement by proving that
they had been exposed to some disease-causing agent. The exposure
requirement has become highly important in claims of emotional distress
over the possibility of contracting AIDS as a result of a defendant's
tortious conduct. Since AIDS is unique in that it is 100% fatal, a
substantial minority of courts have been willing to liberalize the
plaintiffs burden of proving the injurious link between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's fear.
Courts imposing this general reasonableness standard emphasize that
the definition of reasonable fear includes any foreseeable risk of harm to
the plaintiff, no matter how remote. If a plaintiff cannot show that
exposure to HIV occurred, the plaintiff could not recover under the
physical injury plus reasonableness standard set forth in the fear of cancer
cases. Although this may or may not be a desirable outcome in a
particular case, the exposure requirement serves a valuable purpose by
assuring a causal link between the defendant's conduct and the victim's
mental distress. Proof of exposure should not be abandoned hastily.
The general reasonableness standard attempts to accomodate the
fears of a reasonable person exposed to the barrage of information about
the deadliness of AIDS by allowing the jury to assess the reasonableness
of a plaintiff's fears. Whether or not the issue should be decided as a
matter of law is certainly debatable. However, the downside of relieving
plaintiffs alleging fear of AIDS in speculative situations is that it
perpetuates AIDS-phobia in our society.
This leads to a vicious circle where emotional distress recoveries are
premised on common knowledge about the dangers of AIDS, but that
knowledge is infected with judicial acknowledgement that what amounts
to AIDS-phobia is reasonable as a matter of law. The practical solution
to this problem is to require a plaintiff seeking only emotional distress
damages for fear of AIDS to show that he or she has actually been
exposed to the HIV virus.
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